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THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW OF JAPAN AND
ITS ENFORCEMENT
MICHIKO ARIGA* AND LUVERN V. RIEKE**
The Antimonopoly Law of Japan' became effective in July 1947,
less than two decades ago. The act was extravagantly endorsed by
the U.S. occupation forces as a charter for the economic future of
Japan.' It was indeed a significant undertaking, designed to implant
democratic practices where none had existed before, and it required
basic, almost revolutionary, changes in the economic structure of the
nation. Equally important was the circumstance that this law was
neither sought nor desired by the Japanese. It was imposed upon a
defeated people, a device entirely alien to the history and culture of
those who were expected to make it work. The purpose of this article
is to examine the act and to attempt an evaluation.
The industrial developments which carried Japan from a feudalistic
society to a major world power in less than a century, measured from
the 1853 call of Commodore Perry to World War II, were accompanied
by constant reliance upon government control and financing. Indus-
tries which had been acquired or initially developed by the Govern-
ment were sold, at very low sums, to favored individuals or firms.
These favored few were further aided and protected through a series
of wars. The firms which in this fashion rose to predominance became
known as the Zaibatsu.' Need for development of industrial controls
generated by the depression of the 1930's, the Manchurian Incident,
and by an increased dependence on foreign trade brought about gen-
eral and ultimately compulsory cartelization of Japan's economy. The
goverment-Zaibatsu partnership reached an apex of mutual de-
pendency and control during the years of World War II. Under such
* Counselor of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission.
** Professor of Law, University of Washington.1 Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving
Fair Trade (Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi k0sei torihiki no kakuho ni kansurn
hritsu) (Law No. 54, 1947)) in 2 EHS No. 2270, enacted April 14, 1947.
2 The notion that antitrust legislation constitutes "a charter of freedom" has been
familiar to the U.S. lawyer at least since Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344 (1933). The U.S. Court meant that the legislation was general and
non-directive in character. As will be evident in reading the provisions of the Japa-
nese act, the emphasis there is more regulatory in tone than the Sherman and
Clayton Acts originally were.
3 The Zaibatsu clique were leaders in finance, industry, and commerce. Control
was maintained and extended by the familiar pyramidal holding company technique.
The same favored family or firm could, and did, have major interests in several areas.
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circumstances it is not surprising that the occupation powers regarded
the Zaibatsu as a structure of unique importance to military aggression
which they felt must be dissolved in the interests of world peace.
In response to Allied demands, the Japanese Government, on Novem-
ber 4, 1945, submitted the Yasuda Plan, a proposal for the dissolution
of four major holding companies. The reply was SCAPIN 244, issued
on November 6, 1945.' The proposed dissolutions were approved, but
it was recognized that even such major surgery could not permanently
supplant the Zaibatsu unless a new economic structure was developed
as a substitute. Paragraph 6 of the SCAPIN dealt with this concern.
In item C of that paragraph the Supreme Commander specifically
directed the enactment of a law which would "eliminate and prevent
private monopoly and restraint of trade, undesirable directorates, un-
desirable intercorporate security ownership and assure the segregation
of banking from commerce, industry, and agriculture and as will
provide equal opportunity to firms and individuals to compete in
industry, commerce, finance, and agriculture on a democratic basis."
The Japanese Government, already committed to reformation of its
economic structure along the lines of free competition, moved quickly
to comply with the directive. Despite the Government's total lack of
experience with antitrust laws, a bill was prepared. The General
Headquarters Staff of the Allied Forces participated in the preparation
of the measure and, if the resulting product was overly detailed and
too meticulously patterned after both the current case and statutory
laws of the United States, the blame must at least be shared by the
joint drafters. The new law was enacted on April 14, 1945, the last
day of the final session of the Imperial Diet under the Old (Meiji)
Constitution. A general election, resulting in the shift of adminis-
tration from the Liberal Party to the Socialist-Progressive coalition,
delayed implementation of the act until July of that year.
As originally enacted the Antimonopoly Law was considerably more
stringent and detailed than the antitrust statutes of the United States.
In the context of Japan's economic history the law was nothing short
of radical. Businessmen, shocked by a measure which forbade so
simple a thing as ownership of even a single share of stock in a com-
peting company, regarded the law as purely theoretical and as wholly
divorced from the realities of the social and economic condition of the
4 SCAP IN No. 244, BissoN, DISSOLUTION OF ZAIBATSU 241 (1954). A "SCAPIN"
is a directive from "SCAP," the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.
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nation. For the purpose of eliminating restraint of trade and monopo-
listic practices the original act was near perfection, and its enactment
can be taken as a token of the Government's sincere determination to
conform to competitive and democratic practices.
As the businessmen of Japan started the reconstruction of their
war-devastated economy, they came to realize the full meaning of the
antitrust provisions. Not only were they unable to do those things
thought proper in the pre-war days,' but it was soon evident that some
of the provisions interfered with even legitimate business activities
under the civil law. Some persons regarded the law as a purposeful
deterrent to economic health foisted upon Japan by victorious nations
eager to prolong the impotence of the defeated people. Even those
persons who welcomed democratic concepts questioned the practica-
bility of the law. The changing relationship between the United States
and the U. S. S. R. influenced occupation policy toward accelerating
the rebuilding of Japan's economy. In light of all these factors it was
inevitable that the law had to be amended and that new legislation
should create special exceptions to its rigor and scope. Both of these
things have happened.
With the assent of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers,
the basic law underwent major amendment in 1949. In 1953, after
the Peace Treaty became effective, the law was again amended.' Many
exemptions, some of which are mentioned later in more detail, have
been made to the original coverage of the act. In 1958, a further sub-
stantial amendment was considered but, due to confusion in the Diet
with regard to other measures, the amendment was not passed. As
this article is designed to provide a general explanation of the current
law, and its enforcement, the amendments will be given only brief
attention at pertinent points.
The law is now 17 years old. It seems safe to assume that it has
passed the period of initial crisis. The remarkable growth of the
5 A circumstance which has been described as "a disappointment to many a business
leader with nostalgic longing for the pre-war days of laissez-faire." Restrictive Trade
Practice Specialists Study Team, Japan Productivity Center, Control of Restrictive
Trade Practices in Japan, 1958 (mimeo). The term "laissez-faire' here means the
freedom of government to favor some businesses and the freedom of businessmen to
contract for a wide variety of restrictive practices.
6 The statement in the text is simplified and not complete. Minor amendments
were made by Laws No. 91 and 195 of 1947, Laws No. 207 and 268 of 1948, and
Laws No. 103 and 134 of 1949. However, Law 214 of 1949 was the first major
amendment of the Antimonopoly Law, and Law 259 of 1953, the next There were
other additional minor amendments in 1951 and 1952. An outline of the original
Antimonopoly Law and the subsequent amendments can be found in Osakadani, Japan,
in ANTITRUST LAWS (Friedman ed. 1956), Adelaide Sheet, West Toronto, Canada.
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Japanese economy has not gone unnoticed by the Japanese business-
man. Nor has he failed to realize that this new maturity has occurred
under the economic conditions produced at least in part by the anti-
trust law. These factors have given rise to a host of supporters for
the law and have confirmed the faith of the original advocates of free
competition. The act is no longer called the law of the occupation,
and it seems, finally, to have its roots firmly set in Japanese soil.
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE ACT AND THE COMMISSION
As originally adopted, the act was lengthy and complex. The ap-
parent effort was to incorporate not only the essential features of the
Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts, but also
specifically to legislate many of the refinements of antitrust law which
had developed in U.S. courts and administrative agencies. Article 1
of the Japanese law indicates the wide sweep of the act as follows:
This Law, by prohibiting private monopolization, unreasonable restraint
of trade and unfair business practices, by preventing the excessive con-
centration of power over enterprises, and by excluding undue restriction
of production, sale, price, technology, etc., through combinations, agree-
ments, etc., and all other unreasonable restraint of business activities,
aims to promote free and fair competition, to stimulate the initiative of
entrepreneurs, to encourage business activities of enterprises, to heighten
the level of employment and national income and, thereby, to promote
the democratic and wholesome development of national economy as well
as to assure the interest of the general consumer.
The article keynotes the entire act. Examination of the detail in
this statement of purpose will quickly disclose the breadth of the
undertaking. The ultimate purpose is to develop a democratic and
sound national economy and to assure the welfare of the general
consumer.8 This objective is to be accomplished by two techniques.
7 The use of et cetera in a statute may strike a jarring note for most U.S. lawyers.
It is a translation of the Japanese word "sonota," meaning "and others" of similar
kind. This type of expression, not uncommon in specialized Japanese legislation, is
seldom or never used in the fundamental code provisions.
8 The statement in itself forecasts possible deviation from basic Sherman Act
philosophy. It has been said that the only direct purpose intended by the U.S. Congress
in enacting the antitrust laws was to protect competition, believing that the public
benefit would be an inevitable but indirect result of such legislation. "[lit cannot be
doubted that the Sherman Law and the judicial decisions interpreting it are based
upon the assumption that the public interest is best protected from the evils of
monopoly and price control by the maintenance of competition." United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). As will be seen below in con-
nection with the discussion of the "public interest" test there has always been a
difference of opinion in Japan with reference to the direct vs. indirect purpose of the
antimonopoly laws.
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The first of these is the familiar prohibition of conduct which would
be destructive of free and fair competition. Three types of conduct
are prohibited: (1) private monopolization, (2) unreasonable trade
restraints, and (3) unfair business practices. The prohibitions are
designed to prevent excessive concentration of economic power and
to eliminate restraints resulting from combination or agreements and
other unreasonable restraint of business activities which need not be
the product of agreement.
The second general technique is the positive development, as con-
trasted with the preceding prohibitions, of entrepreneurial initiative,
business activity, employment, and national income. It will also be
noted that the positive aims of the legislation are directed toward
three distinct divisions within the total population: entrepreneurs
and businessmen, employees, and the general consumer.
The decision to include regulatory measures as well as prohibitions
in the act made it necessary to create an administrative body. The
agency which was created for this purpose,9 known as the Fair Trade
Commission (K6sei Torihiki Iinka) is composed of a chairman and
four other members." The Commissioners are appointed by the Prime
Minister subject to the approval of the Diet. The act requires that
the Commissioners shall be persons who are "of learning and ex-
perience in laws or economy.""1
Prior to World War II, Japan had no administrative agencies or
commissioners which were independent of the executive ministries.
There simply was no counterpart to the administrative bodies of the
United States. A few commissions were established during the occupa-
tion days, but most have since been abolished. For budgetary and
organizational purposes the Commission is under the Prime Minister's
Office.12 It enjoys complete independence in its enforcement pro-
cedures," and the Commissioners enjoy a type of civil service protection
from salary reduction or, except for grounds specified in the act,
dismissal from their positions." The Commission makes an annual
report to the Diet through the Prime Minister.15
The Commission staff, currently 266 people including typists and
clerks, is divided into a Secretariat, Investigation Division, Economic
9 Art. 27.
10 Art. 29. The original act provided for a total of seven members. The latex
reduction in number was solely for purposes of economy.
"Art. 29 (2).
12 Art 27 (2). 14 Art. 31.
Is Art. 20. 15 Art. 44.
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Division, and, as of April of this year, a Transaction Division. For the
year 1964 the appropriation for Commission work is approximately
$617,000. In addition to the central office in Tokyo, the Commission
has branch offices in the cities of Nagoya, Osaka, Fukuoka, and
Sapporo.
Because Japan lacked her own precedent for administrative agen-
cies, and because of the considerable influence exerted by the occupa-
tion staff, the Fair Trade Commission has much the same function as
the American counterpart. It is expected to use its expertise, guided,
of course, by the fundamental objective of the act. The Commission
investigates, conducts hearings, issues cease and desist orders, receives
reports and issues certain permits, studies trade practices, and formu-
lates standards of fair dealing-all in a pattern familiar to the U.S.
lawyer. Specific procedures have, of necessity, developed. These will
be considered below.
BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE LAW
The historic struggle in the United States between those advocating
a per se test of violation and those who prefer the rule of reason
approach is too well known to require extended retelling here. Our
purpose will be sufficiently served by a reminder that this classic
battle which commenced in the relatively simple setting of the Sherman
Act 6 has also been fought in the more sophisticated environment of
the Clayton provisions'-and no doubt will continue to be a lively
issue for years to come. The significant point is that the trend has
been from the rigor of per se to the flexibility of rule of reason in all
areas. This same progression is evident in the Japanese antitrust
experience.
THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" TEST
In the definition of private monopolization and unreasonable re-
straint of trade, the Japanese act prohibits certain types of activity
when the consequence would be "contrary to the public interest."'"
16The first definitive statement of the modern rule was, of course, made in
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
-I Examples familiar to any antitrust student involve such problems as the tying
clauses of International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); the ex-
clusive dealing problems of Standard Oil of California v. United States, 312 U.S. 457
(1941); Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); the use
of vertical customer and territory restrictions, United States v. White Motor Co., 372
U.S. 253 (1963); and of course the merger problems, perhaps best illustrated by
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
18 Art. 2 (5) and (6).
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This phrase is not a substitute for the familiar "substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly"' 9 but is an additional test.
During the occupation period the phrase did not give rise to any
difficult problem of interpretation as a restraint of competition was
in itself regarded as contrary to the public interest. It was sufficient
for purposes of the Antimonopoly Law simply to find concerted
activity or an act of private monopolization.
Doubt concerning proper interpretation of the "public interest"
language accompanied the growing interest in relaxation of the law.
As a commentary prepared by the Fair Trade Commission Staff Office
at the time of the 1953 amendment to the law stated:
[T]here can be two fundamental opinions sharply divided as to what
'public interest' indicates. The one group, viewing it narrowly, is of
the opinion that the public interest referred to in this place indicates
the economic order based on free competition and any matter effecting
it contravenes, immediately and directly, public interest. The other
group, viewing it broadly, is of the opinion that, though the principle
of free competition is accepted as a rule, the public interest here referred
to indicates general national public interest on the level going far beyond
the interest of free competition.20
The statement reflects the division of opinion between those who
advocate prohibition of all restraint upon competition as evil in itself,
and those who would apply the law only as a corrective to a restraint
found to be abusive of the public welfare generally as contrasted to
injurious to competitive freedom.2' There is obviously a significant
difference in these points of view, especially in the setting of traditional
Japanese affinity for government-aided and approved oligopolies. The
first interpretation would, for example, leave no room for a cartel-
good or bad-while the second approach leaves this question open for
consideration.
Article 1 of the Antimonopoly Law, which states the purpose of the
19 The Japanese counterpart to this Clayton § 3 and § 7 language is stated in terms
of "a substantial restraint of competition" and is discussed in greater detail later in
this article.20 KAiSEI DOKUsEN =KSnIro x msEsu (Commentary on the Antimonopoly Law,
as amended) 106 (FTC Staff Office ed. 1953).21Justice Frankfurter, in Standard Oil of California and Standard Stations, Inc.,
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 311 (1949), states the distinction this way: "Congress
has authoritatively determined that those practices are detrimental where their effect
may be to lessen competition. It has not left at large for determination in each case
the ultimate demands of the 'public interest.' ... We are faced not with a broadly
phrased expression of general policy, but merely a broadly phrased qualification of an
otherwise narrowly directed statutory provision:'
1964]
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act, does indeed pronounce the principle of free and fair competition
as a means of advancing the interest of the general consumer. How-
ever, this is not the definition of "public interest," nor does it control
the interpretation of that standard of legality.
As suggested earlier, the intent of the original act was clear enough.
Article 4, for example, was an emphatic application of the per se
doctrine2 and article 8 was more extreme in its provision concerning
bargaining strength than comparable U.S. law has ever been.3 Article
9 prohibited all holding companies. Holding any stock in competing
firms was prohibited by articles 10 and 11, and article 13 made inter-
locking directorates unlawful. Intercompany loans, a maneuver never
expressly prohibited in the United States, were outlawed by detailed
provision in article 12. Article 15 placed extensive limitations upon
mergers and acquisitions between competing firms. Under these sec-
tions of the original act there was no room for a moderate rule of
reason interpretation, and early cases reflected this fact. In the Yuasa
Mokuzai Kabushiki Kaisha (Yuasa Lumber Co.) and 64 Others
Case,24 the Fair Trade Commission said:
As in the case herein, the act of joining price-fixing on the occasion of
the open bidding by entrepreneurs . . . contravenes the spirit of article
1 of the Antimonopoly Law, the target of which is preservation of free
competition, and blurs the virtue of the bidding system. It is justifiable
to admit the act itself was in conflict with the public interest; and
whether the content of the agreed price was appropriate or not, or
22 Article 4, applicable to concerted practices, made illegal per se the fixing, main-
taining, or increasing of price; restraints upon amount of production or sales;
restraints upon technology, kinds of production, or allocation of market or customers;
and restraints upon construction, expansion, or improvement of productive capacity.
The article did not apply if the effect of the concerted activity would be "negligible"-a
concept which might be close kin to the quantitative substantiality implications of
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), and the de minimis non
curat lex arguments frequently encountered in U.S. antitrust cases.
23 It is of course familiar doctrine that the U.S. law does not make "monopoly in
the concrete" illegal. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1(1911). There must be evidence of abusive use, purpose, or intent to make bigness
bad, or at least such is the theory. See generally the discussion at page 55 et seq. of
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS (1955). Not so under the original article 8 of the Antimonopoly Law. It
authorized the issuance of orders designed to eliminate "undue substantial disparities
in bargaining power" which were not the result of monopolization nor other wilful
conduct.
24 1 KoSEI TORIHIKI IINICAI SHINKETSUSHU [hereafter cited FTC DEcIsION RE-
PORTS] (FTC, Aug. 30, 1949) 62, 84; Restrictive Trade Practice Specialists Study
Team, Japan Productivity Center, op. cit. supra note 5, at 130. Similar statements
can be found in the Noda Sh6yu Kabushiki Kaisha (Noda Soy Sauce Co.) case,
9 FTC DECISION REPORTS (FTC, Dec. 27, 1955) 57 (includes Tokyo High Ct.
decision, Dec. 25, 1957; FTC decision translated into English in 1 FAIR TRADE(No. 4) 18 (1958)), and in the Kabushiki Kaisha Asahi Shimbunsha (Asahi News-
paper Co.) Case, 3 FTC DECISION REPORTS (FTC, April 7, 1951) 4.
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whether the entrepreneur got undue benefit or not, or there was a loss
to the country or not; these matters do not necessarily constitute a
standard to determine the existence or non-existence of public interest.
This early orientation is no longer universally accepted. Amend-
ment or repeal of some of the original provisions, and the creation of
new exemptions for some cartelization25 has clouded the meaning of
"public interest" even though article I has remained substantially
unchanged. There were some allowances for cartels and monopolies
in the original Antimonopoly Law. Some of these, for example the
operation of "natural" monopolies"8 and the utilization of patent or
copyright interests," will seem ordinary enough to the American
lawyer. Nor will the exemption of article 24, applicable to voluntary,
small-scale business cooperatives, seem inappropriate. The departure
from the historical U.S. pattern lies in exemptions granted "under the
provisions of a special law,"" especially as exemptions have multiplied
in areas which present no obvious reason for special consideration. 9
In light of these developments it is not unnatural that there is a
question concerning the proper interpretation of "public interest."
The extensive exemptions do suggest a philosophy other than that
of the preservation of free competition. However, as will be discussed
in greater detail below, the Fair Trade Commission is still authorized
to evaluate the justification for each cartel requested under a pro-
vision of the Antimonopoly Law. Cartels permitted under industry
2 5 Article 24-3 permits "concerted activity against depression," and Article 24-4
permits "concerted activity for enterprise rationalization." A current statement and
report bearing on this matter can be found in an article by Hiroshi Iyori, Cartels in
Jpa, The Oriental Economist, Jan., 1964, p. 25. One is reminded of the closely
parallel behavior of the European Economic Community which, by article 85(3) of
the Rome Treaty, has permitted certain group restrictive practices and is now con-sidering enlargement of these exemptions. This parallel is to be expected, of course,
as Japan is a civil law nation. The 1953 exemptions to the Japanese law for "anti-
depression" and "rationalization" cartels, cited above, were patterned after provisions
then pending in West Germany. Articles 5 and 8 of the German law, I BUNDESGE-SIrzB3Lxrr 1081, adopted in 1957, provide for similar cartels.Another interesting comparison can be made to the Monopolies and Restrictive
Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act of England, adopted on July 30, 1948. Thatact prohibits restrictions which "operate or may be expected to operate against the
public interest," 11 & 12 Geo. VI, c. 66, § 6(2).Even th  United States experimented with "rationalization" and "codes of faircompetition" during the depression of the 1930's. See: Rma'T OF TH Arr'v GEN.'SNATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, pra note 23, at 129.
2 8 Art. 21. This article exempts those persons engaged in "railway, electric, gas,or any other enterprise which is a monopoly by its very nature."
27 Art 23.2as r 22.29 Statutes exempting given industries from the Antimonopoy Law are numerous.The exemptions are granted in the law dealing with the specific industry, not the
basic antimonopoly act.
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laws are authorized by the ministry in charge of that segment of the
economy, not by the Fair Trade Commission, but even in these in-
stances the exemption may be granted only after the Commission has
been duly consulted."0 There is, in short, still some opportunity for
the free competition principle to operate.
THE "SUBSTANTIAL RESTRAINT" TEST
The phrase "substantial restraint of competition in a particular
field of trade" is found in almost identical form in various provisions
of the Antimonopoly Law."' This test is basic to the entire act and
it will be expedient to explain the terms used before going on to other
substantive provisions.
1. Particular field of trade.
With these words, the Japanese law introduces the familiar concept
of the market. In the search for the area of effective competition,
significant considerations include geographical trade patterns, product
identity, and the level of function, or distribution, common to the
entrepreneurs involved.
The Tjkj Kabuskiki Kaisha (T6h6 Co.) Case"3 involved a long-term
lease, with T6h6 as lessee, of the Orion and Subaru theaters in Tokyo.
The Fair Trade Commission treated the Marunouchi and Yiirakuch6
districts as the relevant geographical area involved, but stated that
an additional area, the Ginza district, might also be included. The
Tokyo High Court, affirming the finding of a substantial restraint,
indicated that the market was the broader area because most of the
theaters which specialized in high-quality foreign films and road shows,
and which drew patronage from all the surrounding regions, were
located within the three named districts.
30 U.S. lawyers, having in mind the history of the banking, petroleum, transporta-
tion, and other regulated segments of the economy, may wonder if a struggle for
control will develop between a given Japanese ministry and the FTC when these
bodies disagree. It seems still too early to know, but the history of Japan would
suggest that the regulatory ministry would emerge the victor. This does not seem
to be the trend in the United States. See United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), as a recent illustration.
31 The lineage is clear, but the words are not identical. Clayton Act § 3 says, "may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce," and Clayton § 7 says, "where in any line of commerce in any section of
the country, the effect . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly."
322 FTC DECISION REPORTS (FTC, Sept. 29, 1950) 146. The FTC decision is
also appended to Tah5 Kabushiki Kaisha (T6h5 Co.) v. FTC, 8 Saik6 saibansho
minji hanreishai 950 (Sup. Ct., May 25, 1954), dismissing (kikyaku) T6h6 Co.'s
appeal from the decision of the Tokyo High Ct., 3 Special Dept., Sept. 19, 1951.
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Nihon Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha (Japan Petroleum Co.) v. FTC"
is an illustration of market delineation based on distribution levels.
The case involved petroleum sales by eleven refiners to the Self De-
fense Board. The Fair Trade Commission decided, and the Tokyo
High Court affirmed, that there is a separate market for major bulk
purchases which is distinct from the balance of the national market.
2. Substantial restraint of competition.
The Japanese law does not employ the "quantitative substantiality"
premise. Substantial restraint must be determined by appraising eco-
nomic impact of the indicated practice upon a "particular field of
trade." The Tokyo High Court has said that "to restrict competition
substantially means that the competition itself decreases, and that a
particular entrepreneur or group of entrepreneurs can bring about a
situation in which they can to a certain extent freely control the
market according to their own will by controlling price, quality,
quantity, or any other term." 4 The substantial restraint prohibited
by the act is not limited to conduct which brings a new limiting con-
dition into the market. Maintaining or reinforcing an existing position
may also be a violation. A firm dominant in the soy sauce market 5
ordered its agents to refuse supply to retailers who deviated from the
firm's announced prices. The Fair Trade Commission did not have to
resort to the ponderous methodology of Parke-Davis8 nor even the
laborious search for concerted action so familiar since the Dr. Miles
case."' It simply found that conduct of the firm brought about a
substantial restraint in competition and was thus unlawful private
monopolization."
8 7 Gy6sei jiken saibanreishCi [hereafter cited Gy~sai reishi] (Tokyo High Ct.,
Nov. 9, 1956) 2849, disinissing (kikyaku) Japan Petroleum Co.'s appeal from the Nihon
Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha (Japan Petroleum Co.) and 100 Others Case, 7 FTC
DEaCSiOx1 REPoRTs (FTC, Dec. 1, 1955) 70.
34T6h6 Kabushiki Kaisha (T6h5 Co.) v. FTC, 6 K6t6 saibansho minji hanreishfi[hereafter cited Kasai minshfi] (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 9, 1953) 873. One is reminded
of the theory propounded in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150(1940), that effective influence over the market, by manipulation of the price dynamics,
may be accomplished without market control.
35 The firm was easily the largest single producer and a national price leader. Its
output accounted for 14.08% of the national supply and 36.7% of the amount shipped
into Tokyo.
8 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).37 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).38 Noda Sh6yu Kabushiki Kaisha Case, supra note 24. "Private monopolization!'
prohibited by article 3 of the Japanese law is not the same as monopolization pro-
hibited by section 2 of the Sherman Act. It is, rather, a substantial restraint oc-
casioned by a single entrepreneur or group of entrepreneurs to control or eliminate
other entrepreneurs. The market monopolized need not be the one in which the
violator or violators trade. "Restraint of trade' is also a substantial restraint, but it
is one imposed by agreement of the violators upon themselves.
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3. Competition.
The Japanese law defines competition. 9 It will be noted that the
entrepreneurs must be horizontally positioned. However, the hori-
zontal relation may be potential in part. In Tjhi5 Kabushiki Kaisha
(T6h6 Co.) v. FTC," T6h6 was a vertically integrated producer-
distributor of motion pictures while Shin-T6h6 was, at the time of the
alleged unlawful restraint, a producer only. At a previous time Shin-
T6h6 had also engaged in distribution but terminated this function
because of labor disputes. The Tokyo High Court found the two firms
in competition, as defined by the act, on the ground that Shin-T6h6
could readily re-enter the distribution field." On the other hand, an
agreement between a group which published newspapers and a group
which distributed the papers, by which agreement sales districts were
allocated, was found not to be a contract between competitors. 2 Even
though the publisher sold papers to subscribers, it did not engage in
distribution to readers' homes. The two groups were not, therefore,
in competition despite the fact that both were entrepreneurs in the
broadly defined newspaper market.
To be in competition the entrepreneurs" must not only occupy hori-
39 Art. 2(4). "The term 'competition' as used in this Law shall mean situations
in which two (2) or more entrepreneurs do or may, within the normal scope of their
business activities and without undertaking any significant change in their business
facilities or practices, engage in any one (1) of the following acts: Provided, that
such act as mentioned in item (2) below shall not be included within the meaning of
competition as provided for in Chapter IV.
(1) Supplying the same or similar goods or services to the same consumers or
customers;
(2) Receiving supply of the same or similar goods or services from the same
supplier."
(Chapter IV, excluded above, relates to stockholding, interlocking directorates, and
mergers.)
40 K6sai minshii (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 9, 1953) 873.
41 The United States has approached the problem of firms with unlike degrees of
vertical integration in a different manner. Even in those instances where horizontal
positioning is required, it is apparently not necessary that firms in the United States
be totally alike-even potentially-so long as they are, at some level, in the required
relation to each other. See, for example, United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,
351 U.S. 305 (1956), and Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Secatore's, Inc., 246 F2d 17
(1st Cir. 1957), which posed the problem in resale price maintenance cases where the
exemption from antitrust coverage applies only to firms which are not horizontally
positioned. Since the 1955 amendment to § 7 of the Clayton Act, the absence of
horizontal relation of merging firms would seem to be of no unique significance.
Perhaps the point of United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586 (1957), is that a horizontal relation was never necessary. Obviously there is no
need to show such common level of distributive function in the usual Sherman §§ 1 or
2, Clayton § 3, FTCA § 5, or Robinson-Patman proceeding.
4 2 Kabushiki Kaisha Asahi Shimbunsha (Asahi Newspaper Co.) v. FTC, 4 Gy6sai
reishii (Tokyo High Ct., March 9, 1953) 609.
43 The word "entrepreneur" is also defined by article 2 (1) of the Japanese law to
include natural and juridical persons who carry on a business enterprise.
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zontal roles with reference to each other, but must also deal in the
"same or similar goods or services." Predictably enough, this require-
ment has led to disputes about how much identity must exist for the
items to be "similar."
The Fair Trade Commission once observed that "standard cotton
yarn which is called spun cotton yarn ...and non-standard cotton
yarn which is called utility cotton yarn . . .are goods used in families
and apparel factories and though there is indeed difference in material
used and quality in a strict sense, consumers and users look upon
them as similar goods."" Because of the essentially undiscriminating
consumer acceptance, the Commission found the entrepreneurs to be
competing in the sale of "similar" goods. In another case, bus and rail
transportation firms which operated lines between the same points
were found to be competitors. 5 Although not the same, the two forms
of transportation were readily interchangeable.
The entrepreneurs must of course, as demonstrated by the first
TMkJ case discussed aboveI" be in the same geographical market for
competition to exist. This is not to say that a party cannot unlawfully
restrain competition except in the field in which he is primarily en-
gaged. For example a banking firm may, by exertion of financial
control, substantially restrain competition between silk reeling con-
cerns. 7 The competitive injury occurs at the horizontal level even
though the economic leverage is exercised by a party in another line
of endeavor.
In general the concepts of public interest, market, restraint, competi-
tion, and levels of functional organization will be familiar to the anti-
trust lawyer of any nation. The variation in particulars has been
suggested above.
4 4 Teikoku Seisbi Kabushild Kaisha (Imperial Spinning Co.) Case, 2 FTC DECIS-
Iox REPORTS (FTC, Oct. 10, 1950) 152. The U.S. cases furnish many illustrations of
this problem. The modem classic is probably United States v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. (The Cellophane Case), 351 U.S. 377 (1956). The question arises
commonly in connection with the resale price maintenance provisions of the Miller-
Tydings Amendment to § 1 of the Sherman Act and the McGuire Amendment to
§ 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, both of which use the language
"commodities of the same general class." Of course the merger cases, under § 7 of
the Clayton Act, have been a prolific source of cases which, in attempting to outline
a market, explore the question of same or similar goods and services.
4 5 Tosa Denki Tetsud6 Kabushild Kaisha (Tosa Electric Railway Co.) and 4 Others
Case, 2 FTC DEclsioN REPORTS (FTC, May 23, 1950) 39.
46 See p. 446 supra.
47Kabushild Kaisha Saitama Gink6 (Saitama Bank Co.) and 17 Others Case, 2
FTC DEcsioN REPoRTs (FTC, July 13, 1950) 74.
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SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
The major substantive provisions of the Antimonopoly Law can be
arranged rather conveniently under five headings: private monopoli-
zation, unreasonable restraint of trade, unfair business practice, sup-
plementary prohibitions related to the accumulation of corporate
interests or control, and provisions concerning international trans-
actions. Despite the bearing these groupings have upon each other, the
most helpful progression will be to look at each division independently.
1. Private Monopolization.
The movement in postwar Japan from greater to less stringency in
the control of anticompetitive practices has already been noted. The
trend is readily observable in the area of private monopolization. It is
also a simple task to identify the pressures which have prompted this
relaxation.
Article 8 of the original act addressed itself to the problem of
monopolization in a forthright fashion. If "undue substantial dis-
parities in bargaining power" were found to exist, the Fair Trade
Commission was either to order the offending entrepreneur to transfer
a part of his business facilities to another firm, or to take other appro-
priate measures to rectify the situation. 8 This power was never in-
voked. Perhaps, had the article not been completely revised in 1953,"9
the corrective would have been used only when the accumulated
bargaining power was employed in an "abusive" fashion, but it seems
that this was not the original intent of the section. The authoriza-
tion was to eliminate substantial disparities in bargaining power, a
strikingly different thing from the suppression of monopolizing con-
duct. Whatever the future might have been, the businessmen of Japan
saw in article 8 only cause for alarm and its early deletion was
inevitable. The return of a comparable provision to the Antimonopoly
Law now seems out of the question.
The removal of the old article 8 reduced the Japanese control over
monopolization to a status more nearly comparable to that found in
the United States. The prohibition remaining after the 1953 amend-
ment is set out in the first phrase of article 3. The statement is simply
that: "No entrepreneur shall effect private monopolization." The
conduct forbidden is monopolization and not, as was true in the
former article 8, the existence of monopoly power. The philosophy
48 See note 23 szpra.
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expressed in 1945 by Judge Learned Hand" characterizes the approach
in Japan well. The dominant firm which has had monopoly "thrust
upon" it by purely technological or other objective factors not con-
trolled by the firm, or which enjoys its position "by virtue of . . .
superior skill, foresight, and industry" is not monopolizing, but when
it acts to preserve or exploit this dominance by actions otherwise legal
but not economically inevitable, a violation occurs. Inequity lies in
abuse, not possession, of the power. At least this is what the limited
experience under the Antimonopoly Law of Japan would seem to
indicate.
The cases are few. During a 16-year period, July 1947 to July 1963,
the Fair Trade Commission issued only five complaints alleging private
monopolization. Two of these cases, the earliest in point of chronology,
terminated in consent decrees.5 The two most recent complaints
were, because of changes in the pertinent circumstances, simply dis-
missed without any decision. The fifth complaint (third in point
of sequence) resulted in a contest and in interesting decisions by both
the Commission and, on appeal, by the Tokyo High Court. The case
was Noda Shyu Kabuszi Kaiska (Noda Soy Sauce Co.),"5 and it
merits scrutiny because of the insight provided relative to the structure
of a typical segment of Japan's internal economy as well as to the
law of monopolization.
Noda is the leading soy sauce producer in Japan. It accounts for
14.08 percent of the national production and is significantly larger
than any other producer. As is the case with many parts of the Japa-
nese economy, the soy sauce industry is essentially dualistic. There
are literally thousands of producers, but only a handful are large
enough to market their product outside the local area where it is
produced. Soy sauce has three recognized grades: supreme, superior,
and best. Price differentials are based upon the grade. In 1958 four
firms produced a "supreme" grade. Their aggregate portion was
nearly a quarter of the national output. In one market, the Kant6
0 oUnited States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945).
5 Baish6 Shisetsu Komp5 Unyu Kumiai (Preparation and Packing Facilities
Transportation Association) Case, 1 FTC DEcIsION REPORTS (FTC, March 27, 1948)
10; and Kabushiki Kaisha Saitama Gink5 (Saitama Bank Co.) and 17 Others Case,
supra note 47.
52 Yukijirushi Nyfigy6 Kabushiki Kaisha (Snow Brand Dairy Co.) Case, 10 FTC
Decision Reports (FTC, Dec. 23, 1959) 44; and T6bu Tetsud6 K6nai Eigyajin Kumiai
(Tbu Railway Concessionaires Association) and 21 Others Case, 11 FTC DEcIsION
REPORTS (FTC, April 12, 1962) 146.
53 9 FTC DEcisION RErORTS (FTC, Dec. 27, 1955) 57.
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area, " the four "supreme" brands accounted for approximately 70
percent of the total soy sauce sold. Noda supplied 36.7 percent of
the total volume; the other three "supreme" brands together comprised
another 31.8 percent. The remaining share of the market was supplied
by producers of inferior brands. Noda, obviously, enjoyed a dominant
position.
Prices were, until 1950, established by price control. After abolition
of control, Noda was recognized as the price leader and uniformity of
price within the grades was normal. During the fall of 1953, some
price disturbance occurred because of increased cost of raw materials.
On December 25, Noda announced a new price and supplied its whole-
salers with a price list to govern the sale of Noda's output at the
wholesale, jobber, and retail levels. Two of the other three "supreme"
brand producers adopted identical price changes later the same day
and the third followed suit two days later. The question then was
whether the retailers could be compelled to adhere to the prices
announced.
Soy sauce in the Kant6 area is distributed through a dozen whole-
sale agents, about thirty jobbers, and ultimately into the retail level
of thousands of wine shops, food, and department stores. Although
most of the retailers accepted the new prices at once, about a thousand
did not. Noda acted quickly and decisively. By exerting pressure
upon the wholesalers, and through them upon the entire line of distri-
bution, dissident retailers were promptly brought to terms by threats
to discontinue supply. As soon as the price on Noda's product was
controlled, the other "supreme" brands, of economic necessity, were
maintained at the same level. In utilizing its power to control price on
its own output, Noda had also controlled "the business activities of
other entrepreneurs, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest,
a substantial restraint of competition in a particular field of trade"5
and effected "private monopolization."
2. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade.
After prohibiting private monopolization, article 3 continues by
providing that no entrepreneur "shall undertake any unreasonable
restraint of trade." The words, in themselves reminiscent of the rule
of reason, are defined by the act5 6 in a manner which could, if taken
54 The area, supplied with soy sauce from the outside, consists of seven prefectures
and Tokyo.
55 The conduct defined as private monopolization in article 2(5).
56 The definition set out by Article 2(6) is as follows: "The term 'unreasonable
[VOL. 39
ANTIMONOPOLY LAW OF JPAA
literally, encompass the entire span of Sherman Act section 1 cases in
the United States. Perhaps it was intended to do just that but, as
will shortly be demonstrated, the decisions of the Tokyo High Court
have restricted the provision to a much narrower scope.
Initially, that is in the Act of 1947, the objective was to classify
concerted practices in restraint of trade into two types: (1) general
restraints which had an unreasonably adverse impact upon competition
in the specific line of commerce, and (2) specific restraints which,
though perhaps less pervasive, were unlawful per se. The former
conduct was to be governed by article 3; the latter by article 4. The
last cited article, applicable to a list of concerted acts specifically
defined, 7 made such conduct unlawful per se unless the consequences
were negligible in the relevant market. General restraints, not within
the defined per se group, were prohibited only when shown to be
substantial. This projection of the Sherman Act pattern was of short
duration. Article 4, and with it the classification of concerted activity
unlawful per se, disappeared as a result of the 1953 amendments to
the act. Control of concerted restraint thereafter rested solely upon
article 3.
While the legislative process was eradicating article 4, the Com-
mission and the judiciary were engaged in reducing article 3 to a level
of relative impotence. The process started with the Kabushiki Kaiska
Asahi Shimbunska (Asahi Newspaper Co.) Case in 1953." s That case
involved an agreement among the publishers of newspapers by which
they allocated territories to their distributors. The Fair Trade Com-
mission, reacting as a court in the United States would in such a case, 9
found the parties were engaged in an unlawful cartel. Upon appeal
the decision was reversed. Starting with the article 2(6) definition
requirement that the entrepreneurs "mutually restrict their business"
restraint of trade' . .. shall mean such business activities, by which any entrepreneur,
by contract, agreement, or any other form, in conjunction with other entrepreneurs,
mutually restrict their business activities to fix, maintain, or enhance prices, or to limit
production, technology, products, facilities, or another party to trade, etc., or executes
such activities, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint
of competition in any particular field of trade."
67 The concerted activities made unlawful per se were:
(1) Establishment, stabilization, or enhancement of prices.(2) Restrictions on volume of production or sales.
(3) Restrictions on technology, products, markets, or customers.(4) Restrictions on construction cr expansion of facilities, or on the adoption of
new technology or methods for production.
583 FTC DEcIsIoN REPORTS (FTC, April 7, 1951) 4.
GO The early case of Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211(1899) was based in part on market division. This conduct is generally regarded as
being a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
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the court held that the parties in concert, the publishers, had not
placed restrictions upon themselves. The vertical restraints imposed
upon dealers, "does not fall under a concerted activity, though it may
form a private monopolization or unfair business practice."6
Another decision by the Tokyo High Court later the same year made
the same point again. The court said:
• ..unreasonable restraint of trade is formed where independent entre-
preneurs in mutual competition jointly impose certain restrictions upon
each other and thereby restrain their free business activities . .. if
mutuality is lacking in the restriction, an unreasonable restraint of trade
does not occur."'
Following true to form the court reversed the Commission's finding
of an article 3 violation, and found, instead, an unfair business practice.
These two 1953 decisions make it abundantly clear that the un-
reasonable restraint prohibition of article 3 is limited to cases in
which there are: (1) substantial restraints, (2) imposed by concerted
action, (3) by parties in competition with each other, and (4) mutually
applicable to all the competitors involved. Thus interpreted, article 3
bears little similarity to the Sherman Act prototype. The ineffective-
ness of article 3 was soon to be made still more obvious. Another
proceeding involving the newspaper industry, commenced during 1958
and only terminated this year, illustrates how crippling the "mutual
restriction" limitation is to enforcement of the act.
Perhaps emboldened by their victory in the Asahi Newspaper Co.
Case, or at least not feeling threatened by the Antimonopoly Law, the
newspapers throughout Japan increased their prices substantially, uni-
formly, and-for all practical purposes-simultaneously. There was
no question but that this pricing behavior was parallel and that the
parties were conscious of that fact. Indeed, the Fair Trade Commis-
sion was able to obtain evidence of meetings at which representatives
of the newspaper companies discussed prices. However, no specific
60 The Fair Trade Commission in an earlier case, Hokkaido Butter Kabushiki
Kaisha (Hokkaido Butter Co.) and 8 Others, 2 FTC DEcIsION REPORTS (FTC, Sept.
18, 1950) 103, had entered a consent decree against a dominant manufacturer which had
entered a resale price maintenance contract with its wholesalers on the theory that a
horizontal restraint between the latter violated the law. The different conclusion in the
Asahi case three years later may highlight the trend toward more permissiveness.
The butter case also involved a vertical restraint. The suggestion in Asahi that this
may be an unfair business practice is comparable to the accepted rule that section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act in the United States does not require a concert
of action. Of course, there is no "mutual restriction" requirement in private monop-
olization. Cf. note 47 supra.61 T6h6 Kabushiki Kaisha (T6h6 Co.) v. FTC, supra note 34.
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proof of agreement relating to price was discovered. While an investi-
gation of their conduct was in process, the newspaper companies, by
letter to the Commission, denied the existence of an agreement to fix
prices. The letter conceded the fact of price uniformity, but it was
insisted that each company set its price independently. Persuaded
that it lacked proof of mutual restrictions, the Fair Trade Commission
discontinued the investigation without ever issung a complaint.
The docility of the Commission in this acceding to the "mutuality"
doctrine drew sharp criticism from scholars62 and especially from con-
sumers. An organized group of the latter even attempted to obtain a
court order directing the Commission to investigate and make findings
concerning the alleged unlawful conduct of the newspaper firms."3
That attempt was not successful, nor was a later attempt to recover in
a direct damage action.6 '
Only one conclusion can be reached-except under circumstances
of most flagrant abuse, concerted restraints are safely beyond the
reach of article 3. Perhaps, as the court suggested in the cases above,
such conduct may be prohibited as an unfair business practice. It is
this portion of the Japanese law we will next examine.
3. Unfair Business Practices.
"No entrepreneur shall employ unfair business practices."85 This
is the third, and actually the last, major substantive prohibition of the
Antimonopoly Law.
The amending legislation of 1953 changed the provisions dealing
with unfair practices, as it did the prohibitions of private monopoliza-
tion and concerted restraints, but with an important difference. It is
at least arguable that "while the general direction of the amendments
was toward easing of restrictions, an attempt was made to make up
62 C. D. Edwards, Monopoly in Japan (unpublished); IMAMURA, SHITEKI DOKUSEN
KINsHIHo No KENxyu (Essays on the Antimonopoly Law) 32-40 (1964).63 Zenkoku Sh6hisha Dantai Reng5 Kai (National Federation of Consumers' Or-
ganizations) v. FTC, 12 Gy6sai reishfi (Tokyo High Ct., April 26, 1961) 933.64The action was brought against the Yomiuri Newspaper Company to recover
damages caused by illegal price fixing. The suit seems to have been brought under
article 709 of the Civil Code of Japan, which is the general tort provision.
The U.S. lawyer, accustomed to treble damage litigation under section 4 of the
Clayton Act, will wonder why the plaintiffs resorted to the general tort law. Japan's
Antimonopoly Law does have, in article 25, a provision for "indemnification of damages
to the person or party injured." This action is for single damages, not triple, as in the
United States. Under article 26, the indemnification may not be claimed until a decision
of the Commission has become final and conclusive.
65 Art. 19. Prior to the amendment in 1953, the words used were identical to the
opening phrase of § 5, Federal Trade Commission Act, viz.: "Unfair methods of
competition."
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for the lost ground by somewhat fortifying the regulation" dealing
with unfair practices.6 Whatever the intent may have been, it is true
that the Commission became more actively engaged in this area
after 1953.67
The prewar trade customs of Japan furnished no precedent for
"unfair competitive (or business) practices," and statutory definition
was essential. Article 2, paragraph 7, set out in the margin below,
provided six very broad and for the most part entirely novel cate-
gories within which specific acts could be designated as unfair. 8
Using its power to make designations,69 the Commission has established
two groups--" Generally Designated"7 and "Specially Designated"'"
-of unfair trade business practices.
66 Restrictive Trade Practice Specialists Study Team, Japan Productivity Center,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 11.
67 As of July 20, 1963, the FTC had issued 191 complaints. Of this number, 78
involved some form of unfair business practice. The shift is especially noticeable in
comparing the activity of the Commission before and after the 1953 amendments. From
1947 through 1953 the Commission issued 82 decrees dealing with monopolization or
restraints and only 11 involving unfair practices. From 1954 through 1960, there were
as many decrees dealing with unfair practices as with article 3 problems-17 in each
category.
For a chart showing type of decree and years issued, see Kanazawa, The Regulation
of Corporate Enterprise: The Law of Unfair Competition and the Control of Monopoly
Power, in LAW IN JAPAN 491 (von Mehren ed. 1963).
68 "The term 'unfair business practices' as used in this Law shall mean such business
practices as designated by the Fair Trade Commission out of those endangering fair
competition and coming under any one of the following items:
1. To discriminate unjustly in the treatment of other entrepreneurs.
2. To deal at undue prices.
3. To induce or coerce unreasonably customers of a competitor to deal with one-
self.
4. To undertake transactions with conditions which unjustly restrict the business
activities of the other party.
5. To carry on transactions with another party by unjustly using one's bar-
gaining position.
6. To unjustly interfere in a transaction between an entrepreneur who is in a
competitive relationship within the country with oneself or is a company in which
one is a shareholder or officer and the other party to the transaction; or where the
said entrepreneur is a company, to induce, instigate, or coerce unjustly the com-
pany's shareholders or officers to do an act disadvantageous to the company."
69 See art. 2(7) above. Article 71 further provides: "The Fair Trade Commission,
desiring to designate specific business practices [as unfair] ... shall hear the views of
entrepreneurs... shall hold a public hearing... and thereupon shall make the designa-
tion after giving due consideration to the views disclosed."
Article 72 provides that "such designations.., shall be made by notification."
70 The "Generally Designated Unfair Business Practices" were established by FTC
Notification No. 11 of 1953.
71 "Specially Designated Unfair Business Practices," issued pursuant to the proce-
dure set forth in article 71, note 69 supra, are tailored to the individual problems of
the specific industries to be affected. A rough analogy exists between these "designa-
tions" and the trade regulation rules and trade practice releases issued by the Federal
Trade Commission in the United States. For a brief description of the U.S. pattern,
see the statement by Chairman Paul R. Dixon in Van Cise, Understanding the Anti-
Trust Laws, Practicing Law Institute Monograph, 1963, at p. 216-17.
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GENERALLY DESIGNATED UNFAIR BusINEss PRACTICES
The Commission's 1953 notification designating general unfair prac-
tices encompasses the types of activity condemned in the United
States under the Federal Trade Commission Act and Clayton Act,
including much of the Robinson-Patman Act. The notification indenti-
fled twelve categories, most of which will sound familiar to the
American lawyer.
Item 1 deals with boycotts, direct and indirect.72 Discrimination in
services, terms, or price are covered by items 2, 3, and 4 and follow
a general Robinson-Patman pattern." Paying an unduly high price
or supplying at an unduly low price (viz., dumping) are made unfair
by item 5, and item 6 prohibits the use of economic advantage and
disadvantage to induce or coerce, respectively, the customers of com-
petitors. Exclusive dealing or unreasonable refusals to deal, item 7,
and tying practices, item 8, have given rise to a number of cases."'
The almost traditional use of a dominant position in the industry and
financial power to control the conduct of other firms, even though
they may not be competitors, is dealt with by items 9 and 10.I Direct
interference in the affairs of a competitor"8 or indirect interference
by inducing directors or shareholders to use their voting rights or
stock transfer prerogative to the injury of the competitor, or to disclose
his business secrets, are designated as unfair practices by items 11
and 12.
These twelve general designations apply to all activities within the
Commission's jurisdiction. The practices specially designated are
additional, not alternative, sets of regulations.
72 Tottori Seikash5 Kumiai (Tottori Vegetable and Fruit Dealers Association) Case
9 FTC DECISION REPORTS (FTC, Feb. 25, 1958) 41, synopsis given (in English) in 1
FAIR TRADE (No. 4) 34 (1958).
73 Harnanaka-mura Shuchuku N6gy6 Ky6d6 Kumiai (Hamanaka Village Livestock-
Agriculture Cooperative Association) Case, 8 FTC DEcIsION REPORTS (FTC, March
7, 1957) 54, translated into English in 1 FAIR TRADE (No. 2) 40 (1957).
74Ch~fky6 Lion Hamigaki Seiz6 Kabushiki Kaisha (Chfiky6 Lion Toothpaste
Manufacturing Co.) Case, 4 FTC DEcisioN REPORTS (FTC, March 7, 1953) 106;
Kabushiki Kaisha Hokkaido Shimbunsha (Hokkaido Newspaper Co.) Case, 5 FTC
DEcISION REPORTS (FTC, May 18, 1953) 5; Taish6 Seiyaku Kabushiki Kaisha (Taish6
Pharmaceutical Co.) Case, 7 FTC DEcISION REPORTS (FTC, Dec. 10, 1955) 99. Earlier
cases, on slightly different facts, had not found exclusive dealing an unfair business
practice. The ambivalence of American treatment of the exclusive dealing problem
can be seen by reading Standard Oil of California and Standard Stations, Inc. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365
U.S. 320 (1961); and United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
75 See text accompanying note 47 supra.7OKabushild Kaisha Mitsubishi Gink6 (Mitsubishi Bank Co.) Case, 9 FTC DEcI-
sIoN REPORTS (FTC, June 3, 1957) 1, translated into English in 1 FAIR TRADE (No. 4)
28 (1958).
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SPECIALLY DESIGNATED UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES
Exercise of the power to designate specific industrial practices as
unfair has enabled the Commission both to eradicate certain evils
and, by initiating trade conferences, to interest trade groups in effective
self-policing. The establishment of fair business practice conferences
has often followed specific designations by the Commission. Trade
associations, serving the same useful functions they do in other
nations,77 also do some self-policing and are expressly prohibited from
promoting any activities which will "cause entrepreneurs to [engage
in] . . . unfair business practices.""
Since 1953 the Commission has issued notifications of specifically
designated unfair practices for thirteen industries. It will be remem-
bered that these are precise applications, announced after special
investigation and a set of hearings, of the categories broadly stated in
article 2(7), the section defining unfair business practices. These
designations make up an interestingly diversified mosaic and demon-
strate the potential of the Fair Trade Commission for this sort of
function.
Two of the early designations which dealt with soy sauce and paste79
(and subsequent designations in other foodstuffs, rubber footwear,
and the match industry) pertained to the use of gifts or entertainment
to procure sales. Such conduct was found to be within the category
of "unreasonably inducing customers of a competitor."
During 1954 the Commission designated as unfair a series of prac-
tices commonly used by department stores against wholesalers."0 The
stores had been using their dominance to obtain price concessions
after goods had been delivered to them, returning goods which had
not moved, demanding that the sellers furnish employees to serve at
the stores, and employing similar maneuvers which will quickly conjure
up memories for practitioners in the United States.8
7 7 An excellent bibliography on trade associations can be found in OPPENHEIm, FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, 131-32 (2nd ed. 1959). Trade associations and cartels have,
of course, special significance in Japan. This aspect of the antitrust problem is dis-
cussed in greater detail below.
78 Art. 8(1)v. The original article 8 which dealt with undue disparity in bargaining
power was repealed. See notes 23 and 48 mipra. The present article is new legislation.
79 Specific Unfair Trade Practices in the Soy Sauce Industry, FTC Notification No.
12 of 1953; Specific Unfair Trade Practices in the Miso [fermented soy paste] In-
dustry, FTC Notification No. 13 of 1953.
80 Restrictive Trade Practice Specialists Study Team, Japan Productivity Center,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 17.
81 Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. F.T.C., 156 F.2d 132 (2nd Cir. 1946); Arden Sales Corp.
v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945).
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Control of the newspaper industry, unsuccessfully attempted under
an article 3 theory of unreasonable restraint of trade,82 did lead to
specific designation of unfair practices for that industry in 1955.88
These designations accompanied a struggle which produced a tempor-
ary injunction issued by the courts and a consent decree issued by the
Commission which found that a lottery to promote the sale of papers
was unreasonable inducement or coercion of a competitor's customers.84
The designation went further and dealt also with supplying excess
papers to distributors and with discriminations in fixing prices and
territories. The earlier court decisions had virtually invited the Com-
mission to make such designations. Businessmen with a long tradition
of cartels and trade associations can understand regulations, arrived
at after discussion among the competitors, much more readily than
they can the bizarre notion that concerted actions constitute an un-
reasonable restraint of trade. Nor, of course, does the presence of
government at such a trade conference seem extraordinary to the
Japanese.
Proceeding logically enough from newspaper publishers in 1955 to
other publishers in 1956, the Commission designated as unfair a num-
ber of specific practices in the textbook industry.85 The novel elements
branded as unfair by this designation were the use of bribes to influence
persons who selected books for schools and the making of statements
which disparaged or injured the reputations of competitors, a problem
in part analogous to that before the U.S. Supreme Court a few years
later.8"
Shipping conferences have long been active in Japan, as elsewhere,
and the specific designation issued for this industry in 1959 was in-
tended to regulate existing conference activities."' Unreasonable re-
fusals to admit to the conference, undue discrimination by shippers or
area, retaliation for shipping on non-conference vessels, and the
abusive use of exclusive contracts, fidelity rebates, deferred rebate
82 See text at notes 60 and 64, supra.
83 Specific Unfair Trade Practices in the Newspaper Industry, FTC Notification
No. 3 of 1955.84 Kabushiki Kaisha Yomiuri Shimbunsha (Yomiuri Newspaper Co.) v. FTC, 6
Gy6sai reishli (Tokyo High Ct, Nov. 5, 1955) supp. 3; consent decree by FTC on
Dec. 8, 1955, 7 FTC DEcIsroiq RFPoRTs 96.
85 Specific Unfair Trade Practices in the Textbook Business, FTC Notification No.
5 of 195680 Eastern R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
87 Specific Unfair Trade Practices in the Marine Transport Industry, FTC Notifica-
tion No. 17 of 1959.
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systems, or comparable practices are expressly governed in the noti-
fication. One detail, the permissible spread of tariff between contract
and non-contract shippers, resulted in a Commission proceeding but
was ultimately and amicably fixed at 9.5 percent.88
The most recently issued specific designations deal with the bottling
and canning industry and especially with the processing of meat. 9
Essentially the problem giving rise to these last designations involved
labelling and misrepresentation matters; more precisely it was the
picturing of cattle and use of the words "beef style" on cans of whale
meat. The analogy to U.S. regulations concerning packaging, adver-
tising, use of descriptive words for furs, wines, watches, cheese, and
other products is so obvious to the American lawyer that citation of
specific illustrations would surely be a work of supererogation.
It is worth noting, however, both for comparative purposes and as a
suggestion of what the future may hold for the Japanese Fair Trade
Commission, that additional legislative enactment has been used to
correct and regulate trade problems. For example unwarranted delay
in payment of subcontractors, who are completely dependent upon
the disproportionately strong general contractors, led to "The Law To
Prevent the Delay in Payment to Subcontractors." Although prior
investigation and recommendations were aided by the Small and
Medium Business Administration, the continuing administration of
the new law was assigned to the Commission." In the same fashion
such matters as deceptive acts in relation to food labels might well be
prohibited by specific legislation and assigned for enforcement to the
Commission.9 The Fair Trade Commission has already demonstrated
its capacity to handle the quasi-judicial and rulemaking powers in
the entire area of unfair trade practices, and the progression to addi-
tional responsibilities would be a logical development.
4. Supplementary prohibitions.
The legislation and dissolutions compelled during the immediate
88 Kyokut6 Unchin D6mei (Far Eastern Freight Conference) Case, 10 FTC DECI-
SION REPORTS (FTC Dec. 23, 1959) 51. The hearings in the case were suspended for
a lengthy period, actually until the conference acceded to the contract system proposed
by the FTC, before the suspension was ordered. After the concession was obtained,
the case was dismissed.
89 Specific Unfair Trade Practices in the Animal and Whale Meat, Etc., Canning
Industry, FTC Notification No. 1 of 1961.
90 Restrictive Trade Practice Specialists Study Team, Japan Productivity Center,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 17.
91 Japan has a Food Sanitation Law (Shokuhhi eiseiho) (Law No. 233, 1947), in 8
EHS No. 8570, but it is presently applicable to public health matters only. There is no
close counterpart to the pure food and drug provisions of the United States.
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postwar days by the occupation forces92 were primarily designed to
eliminate the oligopolistic structure which had dominated Japan's
industry. In particular the unique Zaibatsu structure was marked
for obliteration. The decentralization accomplished by these original
acts was to be perpetrated by adoption of the Antimonopoly Law of
1947 and the Trade Association Law (Jigydsha dantaihei) of 1948." 3
Both acts contained strong prohibitions in addition to the substantive
provisions relating to private monopolization, unreasonable restraints,
and unfair practices which have been reviewed above. The restrictions
in original form, as has already been noted, were so stringent as to be
almost punitive in effect. The agitation for reform, especially with
reference to the prohibitions against cartels,94 was immediate and
vigorous.
On the other hand, the reasons for preventing a resurgence of dom-
inant firms, especially in the prewar traditions, and an oligopolistic
industrial society were also strong. The occupation authorities re-
garded the Zaibatsu as a prime engine of the military. Some Japanese
businessmen and scholars were persuaded concerning the utility of the
new laws, and a number of small- and medium-sized organizations
regarded the dismemberment of the dominant firms as a rare opportu-
nity to develop new stature in an economy which for centuries had been
characterized by a dualistic structure-the very large and the very
small, with few firms of intermediate size.
The struggle is not yet over, but the victory can be easily predicted.
What were originally strong prohibitions against mergers and the
acquisition of interests in competing firms or the formation of cartels
have been reduced to provisions which are simply supplementary to
the other substantive sections of the Antimonopoly Law. It is not nec-
essary to review the course of amendment in detail.95 The story is
92 See note 4 supra.
9 3 Law No. 191 of 1948, effective July 29, 1948. This law, as substantially amended
in August of 1952 and thereafter in September of 1953, was merged into the Anti-
monopoly Law where it now appears as article 8.94 
"Restraint of competition by collusion of the competitors has always been and
still is the favorite technique most frequently resorted to. Indeed, faith in the benefit
of this way of regulating competition is so deep-rooted that the general run of business-
men appear simply unable to comprehend why its legality should be called into question.
It is no wonder there exist so many laws whose main purpose is to free entrepreneurs,
large and small, from the restrictions on forming a cartel and there is persistent
clamour for further relaxation of this rule." Restrictive Trade Practice Specialists
Study Team, Japan Productivity Center, op. cit. supra note 5, at 17. The foregoing
quotation is from a statement after the drastic liberalization in control of cartel activity
and trade associations had been accomplished!
95 The first major amendment in 1949 made it possible for one corporation to own
shares in another and for a person to serve as director for several firms, provided no
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essentially understood when one appreciates the fact that the per se
quality which originally characterized the several provisions-except
for the still categorical prohibition of holding companies-is gone. All
the provisions below, save the exception just mentioned, now incor-
porate the standard of "substantial restraint" as a prerequisite of
illegality.
This does not mean that the supplemental provisions are unimportant
but only that they are far less limiting than they once were. In actual-
ity, several of the controls even now are sharper than those in the
United States, and all remain factors of some magnitude. We will now
look briefly at these provisions.96
HOLDING COMPANIES
The Zaibatsu existed by means of holding companies. Article 9
states: "The establishment of a holding company shall be prohibited."
It is interesting that in all the clamor for modification of the anti-
monopoly laws, there has been little or no call for the deletion of this
provision. As defined by the act, a holding company is one "whose
principal business is to control the business activities of a company or
companies in Japan by means of stockholding.. . ", and does not in-
clude holding of shares as an investment only 9 8
Only one case has been initiated under article 9, and it was dismissed
by condonation at the time of the peace treaty.9
STOCKHOLDING
The person or company prohibited from owning a single share of a
competitor's stock just fifteen years ago may now buy with impunity
substantial lessening of competition would result and no unfair trade practices were
involved. Mergers and acquisitions were made possible, also, on the conditions that no
unfair practices were used and that there was not substantial danger of monopoly or
lessening of competition.
The separate Trade Association Law was amended in 1952 and again the next year
when the most important relaxations of controls, and the first significant authorization
for cartels formation, were adopted. Despite some attempts, no further amendments of
importance have been made since 1953.
96 Chapter IV of the Antimonopoly Law, composed of articles 9 through 18, deals
with holding companies, intercorporate stockholding, interlocking directorates, mergers,
and the authorization for sanctions to be imposed in the event of violation of these
provisions. Chapter II, entitled "Private Monopolization and Unreasonable Restraint
of Trade," contains another supplementary provision dealing with international agree-
ments which will be considered separately.
97 Kanazawa, supra note 67, at 487, citing Ashino, Experimenting With Antitrust
Law in Japan, 3 JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 31, 35-39 (1959).
98 A predictable circumstance in light of the express provision for such holding in
§ 7 of the Clayton Act.
9 9 
FAIR TRADE CoMMIssIoN, Kosai TORIHIKI IINKAI NENJI HOKOKU (FTC annual
report) [for 1950] 84.
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unless the acquisition would result in a substantial restraint of competi-
tion or unless the acquisition involves an unfair business practice.10
An application of the stockholding limitation was made in 1957 when
Nihon Gakki Seiz5 Kabushiki Kaisha, which then produced 54% of the
pianos, 647 of the organs, and 28% of the harmonicas-in each case
being the first-ranking producer in Japan-acquired, in the name of a
third firm, 24.5% of the outstanding shares of one of its major com-
petitors. The competitor, Kawai Gakki Szisakusho, produced 167,
13 7, and 77 of the instruments named above. The acquisition, which
would have given Nihon Gakki 707, 77%o, and 35% of the total na-
tional production for these instruments, was held to involve a sub-
stantial restraint of competition. The surprise to the American lawyer
will not be in the finding of restraint but in the recommendation, which
was ultimately assented to, that the respondent dispose of all but
300,000 of the 772,500 shares of the Kawai Gakki stock it had
acquired.'
Financial institutions, separately provided for by article 11 of the
act, may not own in excess of one-tenth (originally one-twentieth) of
the stock of other companies unless the permission of the Fair Trade
Commission is first procured. Permission for such ownership is limited
to circumstances set forth in the article and is to be granted only after
the Commission has consulted with the Minister of Finance. 02
Although the earlier firm controls over intercompany loans and share-
holding are now gone,'0 3 there is still remaining a series of filing require-
ments. Companies, other than financial, with assets over a hundred
million yen must report their shareholdings to the Commission an-
nually. Foreign companies, which are exempted from reporting their
shareholdings but which must file reports, are all assumed to have assets
in excess of the amount indicated. Persons and firms other than com-
panies must report, within 30 days of acquisition, holdings in excess of
100 Article 10 sets out the rule for companies, other than financial concerns, and
article 14 applies to persons, natural or juridical, other than companies. It is interesting
to notice that both sections expressly prohibit, when a substantial restraint would be
caused, either the acquisition or owning of shares. This goes beyond the Clayton § 7
prohibition against acquiring shares but of course not beyond the interpretation of that
section in United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
101 Nihon Gakki Seiz6 Kabushiki Kaisha (Japan Musical Instrument Manufac-
turing Co.) Case, 8 FTC DEcISiox REPORTS (FTC, Jan. 30, 1957) 51, translated into
English in 1 FAIR TRADE (No. 2) 32 (1957).
10 2 Kabushili Kaisha Daiwa Gink5 (Daiwa Bank Co.) Case, 10 FTC DECISION
REPoRTs (FTC, June 26, 1961) 36.
103 Articles 10, 11, and 12 were repealed by Law No. 214 of 1949. The current
articles 10 and 11, discussed above, are new and much milder sections. There is no
article 12 in the present Antimonopoly Law.
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10% of the shares of each of two or more companies which are in
competition.
INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES
Section 8 of the Clayton Act pertains basically to financial institutions
and the directors, officers, and employees in that profession.'" Article
13 of the Antimonopoly Law of Japan has never been so narrow. At
one time it prohibited, in all cases, a person from being an officer in
competing companies. Today interlocking directorates, in the absence
of certain unfair business practices, are permitted unless a substantial
restraint of competition may be occasioned. One holding a position
in competing companies must report that fact to the Commission, how-
ever, within 30 days of accepting the dual position if either firm has
assets in excess of one hundred million yen.
MERGERS
The antimerger provisions of Japan were surely shaped by the
frustrations experienced in the United States with the 1914 Clayton
Act provisions.' The first limitations on mergers were such that firms
could unite only after obtaining permission from the Fair Trade
Commission, and that consent could not be given when any of several
circumstances existed.' 0 Even after the inevitable amendments,"°' the
restrictions imposed by the Antimonopoly Law are-at least in the
book-more confining than the U.S. counterparts. Article 15 prohibits
merger if a substantial restraint of competition will be caused or if
the acquisition has been effected by unfair business practices. Article
104 Clayton § 8 also prohibits interlocking directorates when nonbanking corpora-
tions are competitors, have assets in excess of a million dollars, and are so positioned
to each other that an elimination of competition would violate the antitrust laws. The
section has been used very little. Judicial discussion can be found in United States v.
W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953), and United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
105 By 1947 when the Japanese antimerger provisions were implemented, U.S.
corporations had learned to avoid Clayton § 7 by transferring assets rather than simply
acquiring stock; Swift & Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926) ; judicial intepretation had
deprived the section of most of its intended effect; International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280
U.S. 291 (1930); Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F.2d 565 (3rd Cir., 1931);
and Congress was preparing for amendment of the section. See: Federal Trade Com-
mission, The Present Trend of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, S. Doc. No. 17,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), and the payoff case, designed to take the Sherman Act
out of effective use in control of concentration, was already on its way to the Supreme
Court; United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
106 Permission for merger could not be given if (1) the proposed merger was not
needed for rationalization of production, supply, or management; (2) a substantial
disparity in bargaining power would result; (3) a substantial restraint in competition
would be caused; or (4) unfair methods of competition (later unfair business practices)
had been used to coerce the merger.
.07 Amendments were made in 1949 and 1953.
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16 makes the same tests applicable to acquiring an interest in a compet-
ing firm by partial absorption of its business or its fixed assets, taking
a lease of its business or being entrusted with its management, or
contracting with it for joint profit and loss ventures.
The considerable-and accelerating-volume of mergers since
1947... has been composed primarily of small organizations."0 9 The
astonishing thing is that, except for the T6h5 case discussed above,
the Commission has issued no complaints."0 Nor is it any longer true
that the mergers involve only companies of modest size or importance.
Since the 1953 relaxation of the antimerger provisions, the Fair
Trade Commission has given particular attention to above sixty
mergers because of their special circumstances. Some of these involved
firms which had been divided as a result of the SCAP Memorandum
Concerning Dissolution of Holding Companies,1 and others involved
merger of companies organized by former officers in a dissolved Zai-
batsu.112 The successful merger of the Ishikawajima Heavy Industries
Co. and Harima Shipbuilding Co. in 1960, which created the second-
ranking firm in new ship construction, was tolerated because the largest
firm, Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., had 16.04% of the
market against the combined 10.12 % for the merged organization.1
108 From 1947 through March 1963, there were 6,355 mergers. Until 1958, the an-
nual average was roughly 300, but there has been a continuing and rapid increase since
then: 400 in 1959 and 1960, 590 in 1961, 715 in 1962, and approximately 900 in 1963.
109 "Of the 5,640 cases up to 1961, the number of cases where the post-merger
amount of capital stock exceeding 1,000 million yen is only 80. It may be said, there-
fore, that almost all of the past mergers have been effected among smaller enterprises"
TRADE BuLzriN CoaRoArroN (Tokyo), MERGERS AND CARTELS IN JAPAN 8 (Japan
Industries series ed. 1964).
110 There were three other contemplated mergers in which the Fair Trade Commis-
sion gave an informal opinion indicating that it would issue a complaint if the parties
persisted in their plans. Each of these proposed mergers involved companies with a
large share of the market and which ranked high in relative standing. The merger
proposals were withdrawn before formal action was taken.
-11 ScAPi 244, Nov. 6, 1945. The first such revival of a company which had been
divided in the immediate postwar era brought together the Yukijirushi Nyfigy6 Kabu-
shiki Kaisha (Snow Brand Milk Products Co.) and Clover Dairy Co. This merger,
which was severely criticized in Imamura, Dokusen kinshi seisaku no 3kue (The
direction of the antimonopoly policy), SiaojI Homu YENKYu (No. 144) 3 (1959), and
Yazawa, Dokusen kinshih6 kaisei ni tsuite (on the amendment of the Antimonopoly
Law), KEIzAmo (No. 1) 37, 41 (1958), resulted in a postmerger share of 57.7% of
the nation's butter supply, 75% of the cheese supply, and 76.2% of the milk collections
in Hokkaido.
Another reunification of a formerly divided firm involved the Teikoku Sen-i Co. and
Chris Sen-i Co., producers of flax yarn and fibers. After merger the firm produced
56.8% of the national supply and was the top ranking firm.
112 The establishment of the trading firms of Mitsui Bussan Co. and Mitsubishi
Shaji Co. are both instances involving such former Zaibatsu relationships. Immediately
after the war, persons prominent in Zaibatsu associations were forbidden to hold
offices in the organization's companies. Law for the Elimination of Zaibatsu Family
Control (Zaibatu douoku shihairyoku haijoho) (Law No. 2, 1948).
"13 An argument which did not work for Bethlehem's attempt to acquire Youngstown
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The most dramatic instance may well be the case of three Mitsubishi
heavy industries, also a single firm in prewar days, which filed notice
of their intention to merge in December of 1963. A public hearing
to elicit opinions from competitors, related industrial companies,
customers, or other persons produced no strong objections to the
reunification. As has just been mentioned, Mitsubishi ranked first in
shipbuilding, and the merging firms were also dominant in the produc-
tion of machines for making paper pulp. The merger was allowed
without challenge. Shipbuilding was regarded as a matter of interna-
tional competition from which Mitsubishi could not exclude compet-
itors. It was further reasoned that paper pulp production was depressed
and the market needed strengthening, and the merged organization
would not dominate any other industry. However, as a condition, the
Fair Trade Commission did require the merging companies to dispose
of one of their two patent licenses for production of paper-pulp
machines so that another firm could enter this market more readily.
Deliberations of the Commission in relation to merger proposals are
not published, but some generalizations concerning the criteria em-
ployed can be deduced from the mergers permitted. Former Commis-
sion Chairman Yokota stated in the Diet in 1953 that a merger which
would give the resulting firm over 30% of the market is at the danger
point of a substantial restraint. This was not intended as a hard-and-
fast rule, of course, but mergers with a lesser share of market have
experienced no problems. Mergers involving larger shares have pro-
duced additional standards. These include some old acquaintances for
American lawyers-the failing company, regulated industry, and cross-
elasticity theories-and some essentially rule-of-reason questions: viz.,
is there strong domestic or foreign competition; how difficult is entry
into the relevant line of commerce; and is the resulting firm still weaker
than its competitors?... One is tempted to agree with a recently pub-
lished statement that it "does not seem that the regulation of mergers
Sheet & Tube Co. in the case of United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp.
576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
114 The statements that market shares are "the primary index of market power"
and "one of the most important factors to be considered" but every merger is unique
and "only a further examination of the particular market-its structure, history, and
probable future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the probable anti-
competitive effect of the merger" were first written by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 343 (1962), and not by a Japanese
judge. Still those sentiments express the approach taken under the Japanese law,
saving only the obvious willingness of the Fair Trade Commission to reach a diffcrent
conclusion from the "commercial realities" than a U.S. court would reach. The
markets of Japan and her industrial needs are simply not those of the United States.
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by the Fair Trade Commission has so far proved a large hindrance to
business activities,"'15 but there is another part to the story which has
not yet been told.
Companies wishing to merge need no longer obtain the prior approval
of the Fair Trade Commission, but they must report their intention to
merge to the Commission. Merger may not be accomplished until 30
days after such notification because the Company Registration Office
of the Ministry of Justice will not accept merger registrations unless
the receipt of notice by the Commission and lapse of the proper wait-
ing period is shown.1 With assent of the applicants, the Commission
may extend the waiting period for another 60 days to permit further
investigation. There is also a program for informal advance clearances
in operation, and in practice companies contemplating merger usually
make informal application for this guidance from the Commission.
Just as with the informal advance clearance in the United States, the
Fair Trade Commission is not bound by informal opinions."7 The
informal clearance, advance reporting, and waiting period procedures
have been almost as effective.
At least some businessmen must believe that the Commission still
exercises a checkrein on mergers because the agitation for still more
relaxation of merger controls has continued. A bill to except mergers
in specific industries such as steel, petro-chemical, and automobile
manufacturing from the Antimonopoly Law was introduced in the
1963 Diet."' Opposition to the proposal was voiced not only in Japan
but also internationally."' The Fair Trade Commission vigorously
opposed the proposed law, arguing that any allowances needed for
rationalization, economy of scale, or advancement in technology, could
be met without exempting the industries from the Antimonopoly Law.
The opposition was directed especially to the portions of the law which
would have applied coercion for the establishment of cooperation among
enterprises, banks, and government. The Commission took the position
115 TRADE BUunnmN CORPORATION, op. cit. supra note 109, at 16-17.11 0 The advance approval requirement probably dates back to the recommendations
of the Temporary National Economic Commission in the United States. Efforts to
amend the Clayton Act to provide for premerger notification have failed. See: Hear-
ings Before Antitrust Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1956), and H. R REP. No. 486, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
Much less has the United States ever had a premerger consent requirement.
1 7 For a description of the U.S. pattern, see HoUsE CosmITTE ON TE JUDIcIARY
ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE No. 5, INTERIM REPORT on CoRPoRATE AND BANK MERGERS,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1955).
11s Specific Industries Promotion Extraordinary Measures Bill (Tokutei sangy5
shinkahu an).
118 Banks, Japan: Open Door with a Catch, Fortune, July, 1963, p. 135.
1964]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
that not even tax concessions should be used as bait to induce the merger
of independent companies. The 1963 Diet adjourned before taking
action on the bill; it was reintroduced in the 1964 session but was not
acted upon.
TRADE AsSOCIATIONS
As explained briefly above, the separate Trade Association Law of
1948, in much diluted form, became article 8 of the Antimonopoly
Law in 1953. The article is supplementary to the article 3 prohibitions
against unreasonable restraint of trade. Agreements by competing
companies to fix prices or allocate customers are dealt with as article
3 matters, not as trade association problems governed by article 8.
The Antimonopoly Law regulates entrepreneurs only, and a trade
association which is not engaged in an entrepreneurial activity does not
come under the prohibitions set forth in the act.
Basically article 8 does two things. It prohibits a trade association
from certain activities,"' and it requires the filing of a report with the
Comimssion within 30 days of any formation or dissolution of an
association and a report of a change in purpose of the association
following the year in which the change is made.
At the close of 1963, there were 18,381 reported trade associations in
existence. The Commission rendered 34 decisions finding violations by
trade associations between May 1953, and July 1963, but in no case
did it order dissolution of an association as it might have done under
authority provided in the Antimonopoly Law.
5. International agreement or contract.
The Antimonopoly Law still has a provision, in article 6, prohibiting
an entrepreneur from entering into an international agreement or con-
tract which would violate the act's provision relating to unreasonable
restraints of trade or unfair business practices. It is further required
that a copy of all international agreements or contracts be filed with
the Commission within 30 days "from the day of its conclusion." These
are the vestiges of the 1947 law requiring prior approval of all interna-
tional arrangements.
The easing of the law resulted first from the need of expediting the
entry of foreign capital into Japan and later as a means of helping
120 The activities prohibited are: (1) substantially restricting competition in any
particular field of trade, (2) entering international agreements which restrain trade,
(3) limiting entry or the number of entrepreneurs in any field, (4) unduly limiting the
function of member entrepreneurs, or (5) causing members to engage in unfair
business practices.
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Japan reestablish its own foreign markets in an orderly fashion. In
actual operation the provision in the Antimonopoly Law has only minor
importance in international transactions. Since the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) was given power to exempt groups
from the Antimonopoly Law, 1 the occurrence of cartels has become
commonplace. Perhaps the purpose of prohibiting private international
cartels was never appreciated by the Japanese. One commentator saw
the original provision as nothing short of a "total renunciation" of
Japan's international trade activities.2
All of the cases asserting violation of article 6 were concluded prior
to 1953. The reason for this is largely historical. The SCAPIN of 1945
which ordered the enactment of the Antimonopoly Law also ordered
the Japanese Government that "it would immediately take steps as are
necessary effectually to terminate and prohibit Japanese participation
in private international cartels or other restrictive private international
contracts or arrangements." In compliance, the Government ordered
a filing of all international agreements 23 and the Fair Trade Commis-
sion was required to process the reports. The result was the issuance of
complaints, all of which were concluded by consent decrees without
resort to formal hearings.
The major problem has involved patent licensing contracts. License
arrangements frequently contain restrictive terms prohibiting the Jap-
anese licensee from obtaining similar technological assistance from the
licensor's competitors or tying accessories or raw materials to the patent
license. Such license restrictions were, at various times, regarded as
unfair business practices as well as violations of article 3 (and originally
article 4) prohibitions against concerted restraints. Protests that the
Japanese entrepreneur was the victim, not the perpetrator, of the un-
fair business practice and that the restraints were not "mutual" as
required under Japanese law led only to the present amendment which,
oddly enough, makes the culpability of the entrepreneur certain even
under circumstances of unilateral coercion. The obvious need to obtain
foreign know-how was another prime factor in hastening exemptions
from this article.
1" ' Under the Export-Import Transactions Law (Yushutsunya torihikiho) (Law
No. 299, 1952, title changed by Law No. 188, 1953) in 5 EHS No. 5560, exporters and
importers, domestic firms preparing goods for export, and dealers in such goods may
under some circumstances be authorized by MITI to agree upon prices, quantity and
quality restrictions, and similar matters. At one time the FTC had to concur in such
arrangements. Now only a filing with MITI is required although that Ministry is
still expected to consult with the Commission concerning the formation of such cartels.
'
2 2 IsHrn, DoxusEN xiNSHiHO (Antimonopoly Law) 164 (1947).
123 Imperial Ordinance No. 33 of 1946, issued Jan. 23, 1946.
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Also there are laws requiring that international transactions which
involve payment in foreign currency, as many patent commissions do
require, await formation until prior approval from a Council on Foreign
Capital has been obtained."' To avoid the embarrassment of attack
by the Fair Trade Commission after approval under these laws had
been obtained, a system of advance informal clearance was worked out.
The practical effect was to exempt, at least temporarily, such transac-
tions from the Antimonopoly Law. Should the foreign currency provi-
sions be abolished, these international agreements involving restrictive
or unfair business practices could be placed in jeopardy under article 6.
However, there seems little concern over this possibility. According
to a recent survey by MITI it was disclosed that most of the 1,134
international patent licensing contracts made between 1950 and 1960
involved export restrictions. Exports are entirely prohibited in 15.7%
of these agreements, and only 14.8% permit export to North Amer-
ica.125
EXEMPTIONS
There are many segments of the Japanese economy excluded entirely
from the private monopolization and cartel-but not the unfair busi-
ness practices-provisions of the Antimonopoly Law. More liberaliza-
tion is often urged. It would be simple to decry the ballooning tendency
of the exempting provision and predict an imminent return to the
cartelized structure of prewar Japan. Dispassionate comparison, how-
ever, might demonstrate that the comparative degree of commitment to
a free competitive economy in Japan and the United States is not as
disparate as one might at first assume."'
As repeatedly demonstrated in the preceding pages, the amendments
made in the years since 1947 have typically moved from prohibitions
124 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Gaikoku kawase oyobi
gaikoku bteki kanrih5) (Law No. 228, 1949) in 5 EHS No. 5010; Law Concerning
Foreign Investment (Gaishi ni kansurn horitsu) (Law No. 163, 1950) in 5 EHS No.
5410.
125 MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY, GAIKOKU GIJITSU DONYU NO
GENSHO TO IVONDAI TEN (The present status of introduction of foreign technology and
its problems) (1962). See also Tanaka, Comments on Selected Japanese Law Bearing
on United States Trade With and Investment in Japan, 7 PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND
COPYRIGHT JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND EDUCATION 418 (Winter 1963-64).
126"[Tlhere are large segments of the nation's business where deference to the
competitive way of life is today taken at best and where the rigors of the marketplace
have been greatly mollified by the cushion of a complex structure of public controls.
Taken in conjunction with other factors, this means that... only a relatively small
fraction of the country's goods and services... [fall] even remotely within the poten-
tial purview of antitrust." Walden, Antitrust in the Positive State, 42 TEXAS L. REV.
603-04 (1964). "Hence, it is estimated that 70 percent of all goods and services pur-
chased by consumers are exempt from antitrust prohibitions." Wilson, Antitrust Policy
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of unrealistic rigor, either never the law in the United States or no
longer so, to rules of "reason" and "substantial restraint" comparable
to current Sherman and Clayton Act applications. The parallel is not
perfect of course, but deviations tend as frequently to more stringent
(e.g., prior reporting, total prohibition of holding companies, specific
and detailed unfair business practices, etc.) as to less militant anti-
monopoly policy. So it is, in general, with exclusions from coverage.
An American comparison within the genus, if not the species, can be
found for almost every exemption from the Japanese law.
Some classification of the exemptions is required for understanding.
From the beginning certain cooperatives, regulated industries, and
"natural" monopolies were exempted. 27 Additional specific exemptions
were made, by provisions in the Antimonopoly Law itself, as part of the
1953 amendment. 128 These 1953 amendments made possible depres-
sion and rationalization cartels and resale price maintenance contracts,
all subject to conditions which will be discussed below. A third group
of exemptions has been made by statutes outside the Antimonopoly
Law.. This last category, which now includes about forty special
laws permitting exemptions, presents the most obvious hazard to the
continued vitality of "antitrust" enforcement in Japan. 3 '
DEPREssIoN AND RATioNALIZATION CARTELS
In 1953, the Fair Trade Commission was authorized to "validate"
the formation of two types of cartels when applicants could demon-
strate the existence of certain conditions. For both kinds of cartel
activity the Antimonopoly Law provides "positive" and "negative"
criteria to be met. It is also required that the Commission shall "con-
sult beforehand with the competent minister" when approval is to be
given.181
The "positive" conditions which must be shown before an anti-
and Constitutional Theory, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 505, 511 (1961). These statements refer
to the economy of the United States, not that of Japan.
127 See text and notes 26-28 supra.
128 Chapter VI, which includes articles 21 through 24, sets out the exemptions.
120 A rather complete picture of exemptions from the Antimonopoly Law can be
found in 1 FAIR TRADE (No. 3) 32-37 (1958) and in Iyori, Cartels in Japan, The
Oriental Economist, Jan., 1964, pp. 25-29.
130 It would be superficial to state the problem in terms of whether "competition"
will continue to exist in Japan. Some segments of the Japanese economy have always
been fiercely competitive and will probably stay that way. Antitrust, after all, involves
some ordering of economic forces even aside from the strictly regulatory measures
embodied in such laws as the Robinson-Patman Act and Federal Trade Commission
Acts of the United States.
131 Article 24-3 authorizes "concerted activity against depression" and Article 24-4
authorizes "concerted activity for enterprise rationalization."
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depression cartel will be approved are that (1) the fall of prices of a
given commodity below the average cost of production has brought
about a situation in which "there exists the probability of endangering
the continuation of enterprise on the part of the majority of said en-
trepreneurs," and (2) it is not likely that the danger can be overcome
by a rationalization cartel.
Given such a set of circumstances the parties may, by agreement,
curtail production and sale of the commodity. If this is unavailing, the
cartel may fix the price.
There are "negative" conditions-the actions may not go beyond
what is necessary to control the "positive" danger; the interests of
consumers or related entrepreneurs must not be unduly jeopardized;
there must be no unjust discrimination; and cartel membership must
be open and voluntary.
Taken together, these are difficult conditions to meet and it is not
surprising that few depression cartels have been formed. The greatest
number to exist at one time, during the rather general recession of 1959,
was five." 2 Only one such cartel existed as of March 1963.
Rationalization cartels are, as will be noted from the discussion
above, a lesser form of restraint than the depression arrangements.
They may be validated to facilitate the improvement of technology in
the relevant industry; the utilization or purchase of by-products, waste
or scrap; the sharing of transport; or "any other enterprise rationali-
zation." The "negative" criteria are those applied to depression cartels
plus the additional requirement that if production is allocated there
must not be an undue concentration in any one member.
The "enterprise rationalization" device has been used more often
than has that of "concerted activity against depression," but still with
surprising infrequency. 3
CARTELS UNDER SPEcIAL EXEMPTIONS
A substantial number of the special exemptions from the Antimonop-
oly Law apply to industries which are government regulated in most
nations. 4 The exemption for small cooperatives, similar to the Capper-
132 The commodities covered by the depression cartels of 1959 were linen yam, yeast,
sheet celluloid, vinyl chloride resin, and hard vinyl chloride tube. The only 1963
depression cartel involved electrode carbon.
1'3 At the end of March 1963, rationalization cartels existed for eight commodities,
namely: spun cotton and vicose yarns, margarine and shortening, synthetic dyes, steel
scrap, spun rayon yarn, linen yarn, automobile tires, and polynogic cotton.
134 Interesting comparisons relative to the degree of antitrust exemption provided
can be drawn between such pairs of legislative acts as:
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Volstead Act in part,35 has already been mentioned. These exemptions
will quickly be understood. The queries arise concerning exclusions
in other areas.
The depression which followed the Korean conflict spurred the first
special legislative exemptions. The synthetic textile industry, over-
extended in response to abnormal war demands and at the urging of
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), had re-
stricted production by agreement. In 1952 this concerted action was
legalized by legislation."' The same crisis produced significant exclu-
sions for commodities involved in export or being produced for ex-
port. 3' Enactment of the last-mentioned exemption was doubly aided
by the United States, first by the existence of a comparable exemption,
the Webb-Pomerene Export Trading Act,' and secondly by the Amer-
ican desire to protect its domestic producers by obtaining voluntary
quotas regulating the price and flow of Japanese goods to the States.'
These have been significant exemptions. Of the 1,002 cartels in exist-
ence on March 31, 1963, ninety percent were in connection with me-
dium and small business or foreign trade?4
Some of the exemptions granted by special laws are essentially
depression cartels in the nature of those discussed above but with less
stringent criteria.' 4 Others establish cartels for the rationalization of
(1) Law Concerning the Organization for Computation of Casualty Insurance
Premium Rates (Songai hoken ryjritsu sanshutsu dantai ni kan.iru h6ritsi) (Law No.
193, 1948) and the Insurance Antitrust Moratorium Act, 59 Stat. 34, as amended, July
25, 1947, 61 Stat 448, 15 U.S.C. § 1013;(2) Marine Transportation Law (Kaij5 u sah) (Law No. 187, 1949) in 2 EHS
No. 2260 and American Shipping Act of 1916, Ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728, as amended, 45
U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1958);(3) Aviation Law (K~kil h) (Law No. 231, 1952) and Civil Aeronautics Act, 52
Stat. 793, 49 U.S.C. § 494 (1938).
18 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1958).
130Law Concerning Temporary Measures for the Stabilization of Medium and
Small Enterprises (Tokutei chfisho-kigya no antei ozi kansuru rinji sochiho) (Law No.
294, 1952). This act was repealed and replaced by the current Law Concerning the
Organization of Medium and Small Enterprise Organizations (Chfish6-kigy6 dantai no
soshiki ni kansuru hiritsu) (Law No. 185, 1957) in 6 EHS No. 6760.
137 Export Transactions Law (Yushutsu torihikih3) (Law No. 299, 1952), amended
and renamed the Export-Import Transactions Law (Yushutsunya torihikihO) (Law
No. 188, 1953), in 5 EHS No. 5560.
18 Ch. 50, 40 Stat 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1958).
130 See the discussion headed "Export Quotas and the Law" at 502-05, Kanazawa,
supra note 67.
:140 Iyori, supra note 129. Of the 1002 cartels known as of March 1963, 591 were
formed under the Law Concerning the Organization of Medium and Small Enterprise
Organizations and 194 were formed under the Export-Import Transactions Law. The
balance of the 90% referred to in the text statement were formed under other special
acts. In 1962, 42A% of Japan's total exports were affected by export cartels.
'4' Coal Mining Industry Rationalization Extraordinary Measures Law (Sekitan
ktgyd g6rika rinji sochiho) (Law No. 156, 1955), which involves curtailment of
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the specific industries.142 Typically these cartels are validated by
MITI which no longer needs-though it did at an earlier date-the
concurrence of the Fair Trade Commission.
There are of course other specific exemption acts which cannot be
detailed here. Some are under attack, for example those in services
such as laundry, barbering, and beauty shops,143 because of the correla-
tion which has been observed between cartelization and increased cost
to the consumers. However, most of the exemptions seem certain to
remain. The question is not now one of repeal but rather whether there
will be more.
CARTELIZATION BY "RECOMMENDATION"
Without specific legal basis, there has developed yet another cartel-
like phenomenon in Japan. Upon the "suggestion" of a government
agency, quotas for production may be allocated within an industry or
prices may be fixed at a recommended level. This evasion of the Anti-
monopoly Law has been used to accomplish production control in such
key industries as textiles, steel, paper, and sugar. The resulting public
criticism, combined with a general improvement of business conditions,
has apparently stemmed this practice, however, and these cartels-by-
suggestion are now disappearing.
ENFORCEMENT OF CARTEL OPERATIONS
Unlike the situation before 1947, the formation of a cartel is normally
left to the discretion of independent entrepreneurs (for some public
utilities the Government may order the establishment), and joining or
leaving is usually optional."4 But not always. Although it has never
production only, and Small Boat Marine Transportation Association Law (Kogatasen
kaiun kumiaihei) (Law No. 162, 1957), permitting price fixing only.
142 Law Concerning the Preservation of Liquor Tax and Liquor Industry Societies,
Etc. (Shuzei no hozen oyobi shurui-gy3 kauniai-to ni kansuru horitsu) (Law No. 7,
1953) referring to quality, facilities for production, and methods of business transac-
tions; Machinery Industry Promotion Extraordinary Measures Law (Kikai ki7gy6
shinka rinji sochih6) (Law No. 154, 1956), dealing with quantity and facility limita-
tions; and Electronics Industry Promotion Extraordinary Measures Law (Denshi
k~gy4 shinko rinji sochiho) (Law No. 171, 1957), relating to quality standardization
only.
143 These cartels are formed under the Environment Sanitation Proper Management
Law (1952). There were, in March of 1963, 274 such agreements involving 29 cat-
egories of business.
144 In prewar Japan, under the Law Concerning the Control of Important Industries(Jfyo sangy5 no tosei ni kansurit horitsu) (Law No. 40, 1931), compliance with cartel
practices could be required of nonmembers. Later in the National General Mobilization
Law (Kokka s~d~inhd) (Law No. 55, 1938), the power was enlarged to permit the
Government to establish company "control agencies" in almost all areas of commerce
and industry.
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happened, the Government could in some instances order outsiders to
join cartels and could prohibit secession. 4 ' It is also possible for "out-
siders" to be ordered to comply with the limitations established by
members of the cartel or, in the case of goods for export, to market only
through a Government-approved syndicate.'46 Failure to obey regula-
tion in these instances may be punished with a fine or an order to
suspend operations. 4 '
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE CONTRACTS
Article 24-2 of the Antimonopoly Law provides an exemption some-
what like that of the Miller-Tydings4 s and McGuire"40 exemptions in
the United States. More precisely, the Japanese exemptions are com-
parable to what remains of the American legislation after the long
series of federal and state decisions which have virtually eliminated the
non-signer provisions,' as Japan's exemption has never applied be-
yond individual, vertical agreements.' 5'
The commodities which may be exempted, in addition to the require-
ments of being branded, in open competition, etc., must be specifically
designated by the Fair Trade Commission. Furthermore, the making of
resale price maintenance agreements must be reported to the Commis-
sion within 30 days of execution.
Despite frequent requests the Commission has, with very few excep-
tions, refused to designate commodities as being eligible for price
maintenance contracts. 5 2
PROCEDURE
Enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law is the responsibility of the
Fair Trade Commission. Following the basic pattern of the Federal
145 Art. 55, Law Concerning the Organization of Medium and Small Enterprise
Organizations, see note 136 supra.
146 TRADE BULLETN CoRPoRATION, op. cit. supra note 109, at A26-A28.
147 There is some question as to the constitutional validity of compulsory member-
ship or sanctions in these cases. See generally, Kanazawa, supra note 67, at 499-500.
.48 Miller-Tydings Amendment to § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as
amended by Public Act 314, 75th Cong., Aug. 17, 1937, 15 U.S.C. 1.
1 49 McGuire Amendment (to § 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act), Act of
July 14, 1952, Public Law 542, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess.
150 For examples, see: Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384
(1951), and Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 55 Wn.2d 1, 345 P.2d 1085 (1959).
151 There is some argument about this point See ImAmuRA, KOKUSEN KINSHIHO
(Antimonopoly Law) 170 (52 HoRiTSUGAxU ZENSHU (Complete Collection on the
Law) ed. 1961).
352As of 1964, the only products which had been designated were cosmetics, hair
dye, toothpaste, soap for family use, liquor, candies, drugs, cameras, and ready-made
T-shirts. Contrast the situation in the United States where virtually all properly
marked goods in free and open competition could be marketed under price agreements.
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Trade Commission in the United States, the Japanese Commission re-
ceives complaints, conducts investigations, and hears cases. Available
to it either directly or indirectly, and in addition to purely informal
adjustments, are most of the familiar sanctions.
If investigation indicates that a violation has probably occurred, the
Commission may "recommend the party... take suitable measures"
and, if the recommendation is accepted, a decision based upon the
recommendation may be issued.' The Commission may, alternatively
to the recommendation procedure, issue a complaint.. to which the
respondent may at once respond with an admission and plan for eradica-
tion of the offense.. 5 or make denial. In either investigation or prepara-
tion for trial, the Commission has adequate powers to compel the
production of records, the giving of testimony, and the general submis-
sion of evidence, 5 ' and must upon demand assist the respondent in
obtaining such evidence." 7 The Commission may utilize a hearing
examiner158 and review his decision, or it may, as in actual practice it
does in all significant disputes, hear the case and make the initial
decision itself.'5
If the Commission believes the matter to be urgent, it may obtain
a preliminary injunction from the Tokyo High Court 6 . and has, in
fact, done so on several occasions. The act also has provisions permit-
ting, if the Commission approves, the intervention of interested third
parties or public bodies.'
When the Commission finds a violation it has, depending upon the
type of case involved, a battery of possible weapons to use in rectifying
the situation."0 2
153 Art. 48. 154 Art. 49.
155 Art. 53-3. The Commission may reject the proposed plan or issue a decree based
upon it.156 Art. 46. This article is another illustration of the fact that the Japanese Anti-
monopoly Law had features not then existing in the United States. The Antitrust Civil
Process Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-14 (1962), did not become law until Sept. 19, 1962.
157 Art. 52.
158 Art. 51-2.
159 Art. 54. The result of a hearing under this article will be a dismissal or the is-
suance of what would, in the United States, be an "equitable" or civil order to cease
and desist, divest, transfer assets, or do similar acts.
160 Art. 67.
1 61 Arts. 59 and 60. But there is no express provision for intervention of private
parties as a matter of right.
162 For private monopolization, the Commission may order the offender to cease
and desist, to file reports, to transfer a part of his business, or to do other acts
necessary to remedy the abuse. Arts. 7 and 20. In addition to the cease and desist
and reporting orders, an order of dissolution may be entered when a trade association
violation is found. Art. 8-2. Cases involving improper stockholding, interlocking
directorates, acquisitions, or mergers may give rise to orders to dispose of shares or
assets, resign from an office, or nullify a merger. Arts. 8 and 17-2.
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Respondents may appeal a decision of the Commission to the Tokyo
High Court, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of antimonopoly
cases. 6 ' If certain problems such as constitutionality are involved, a
further appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court. 64 Facts found by
the Commission, "if supported by substantial evidence," are binding
upon the Court.69
The law does authorize an award of damages to a private party if the
Commission has first issued a decision finding a violation'66 although,
except for one out-of-court settlement,6 there have apparently been no
awards made.
Violations of the prohibitions of the act, except unfair business prac-
tices, may subject the offender to criminal penalty.6 8 Private monopoli-
zation and unreasonable restraint violations could, in theory, result in a
fine and imprisonment. The Commission would initiate the proceedings
by filing a complaint with the Procurator General."6 9 However, in 16
years experience under the act, only three indictments have been
brought, and all of these were during the occupation period. Only one,
after appeal to the Supreme Court, resulted in a fine.'
CONCLUSION
The amendments to Japan's Antimonopoly Law have been numerous.
The important amendments came immediately after the war and the
peace treaty, however, and the trend seems now to have abated. Pro-
posals for major changes were rejected in 1958. The Specific Industries
103 Art. 85. The reason for granting exclusive jurisdiction to one court is found
in the novelty of both the Antimonopoly Law and the concept of an independent
commission. It was also hoped that the use of a single appellate court would produce
a uniform and consistent line of decisions.
There have been eight appeals taken to this date. In five cases the Commission's
decision was affirmed. In the other three its decision was partially modified.
164 Art. 88.
165 Art. 80.
166 Arts. 25, 26, 84, and 85. The liability in such a case is said by the act to be
"absolute," and the violator is not to be excused by "showing the non-existence of
wilfulness or negligence on his part."
167 Kabushiki Kaisha Kosaka Yakkyoku (Kosaka Medicine Co.) v. Taish6 Seiyaku
Kabushiki Kaisha (Taish6 Pharmaceutical Co.) 9 FTC DEcisiox REPORTS (Tokyo
High Ct., Feb. 19, 1958) 162.
168 Arts. 89-95. Violation of a cease and desist order may be punished by a criminal
penalty even if the order is directed at an unfair business practice.
169 Art. 96.
170 The criminal cases were Japan v. Yamaichi Sh6ken Kabushiki Kaisha (Yamai-
chi Securities Co.) (Tokyo High Ct, Dec. 28, 1951) (unreported), in which the
prosecution was withdrawn; Japan v. Okawa G6mei Kaisha (0kawa Partnership in
Commendam Co.) (Tokyo High Ct, May 12, 1952) (unreported), dismissed at the
time of the Peace Treaty; and Japan v. N6rin Renraku Ky6gikai (Agriculture and
Forestry Liaison Conference) (Tokyo High Ct, April 27, 1951, and Sup. Ct., Dec. 5,
1961) (both unreported). The last case resulted in a fine of Y10,000-less than $28.00.
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Promotion Extraordinary Measures Bill.. 1 (designed in part to ease
the restrictions on rationalization cartels) introduced into the Diet in
1963 and again in 1964 has failed to attract the support needed for
enactment. These developments are significant indications of what the
future may hold.
It must also be remembered that many of the former amendments
were virtually inevitable in light of the unrealistic provisions of the
original act. As now amended, the Japanese law is seldom more permis-
sive of restraints, and at points is more restrictive, than is the law of
the United States.
Perhaps the most interesting point is the new attitude of the Japanese
businessmen and others affected by the act. Most of the initial hostility
and suspicion of the act, certainly normal reactions to a completely
novel law with its genesis in the mandate of the occupation forces, has
disappeared. Today the Antimonopoly Law is better understood, and
there has developed with the understanding an appreciation of the
contributions which free competition can make to the economy of
Japan. Much of Japan's success in developing her postwar reconstruc-
tion is credited, by the Japanese, to the policies of the act, and many
persons look optimistically to the law as a means of combatting rising
prices.
Under the circumstances it appears reasonable to assume that no
further important inroads will be made and that the Antimonopoly Law
is in Japan to stay.
171 Supra note 118.
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